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I. INTRODUCTION
When sixty-nine' members of the World Trade
Organization ("WTO")2 signed the Basic Telecom
Agreement in 1997, 3 they agreed to open some or
all of their basic telecommunications services mar-
kets to foreign competition for the first time. The
WTO signatories hoped that the Basic Telecom
Agreement would ensure that national telecom-
munications monopolies became a thing of the
past. Just a few years after its adoption, the Basic
Telecom Agreement faced its first real test.
This test was the challenge by the United States
to the practices of the Government of Mexico and
its main telecommunications carrier, Telfonos
de Mexico DA de CV ("Telmex"). 4 The United
States alleges that Cofetel, the Mexican communi-
cations agency, has adopted regulatory measures
that are anti-competitive and tolerated established
I Fourth Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in
Services, Feb. 15, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 354 at 357 [hereinafter Ba-
sic Telecom Agreement]. Actually, the 69 WTO Members re-
present 70 contracting parties, as the European Union is
bound in addition to its 15 Member states. The 60 WTO
Members represent governments or separate customs territo-
ries with full autonomy in the conduct of their external com-
mercial relations. Of the parties to the WTO Basic Telecom
Agreement, Hong Kong remains a WTO Member by virtue of
its status as a separate customs territory of the People's Re-
public of China and may participate in relevant international
organizations and international trade agreements, such as
the WTO. Id.
2 See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994; The
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotia-
tions: The Legal Texts 2 (GATT Secretariat 1994), 33 I.L.M.
1125 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement]. The WTO was
created by the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization.
3 Basic Telecom Agreement, supra note 1, at 366. As de-
scribed below, the commitments undertaken as a result of
the WTO Basic Telecommunications services negotiations
are incorporated into the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS) by the Fourth Protocol to the GATS. These
trade barriers contrary to the Basic Telecom
Agreement. 5 This is the first formal WTO dispute
concerning the Basic Telecom Agreement.
The U.S. decided to challenge the Mexican pol-
icies in the WTO both because of the legal issues
involved and because of the commercial signifi-
cance of the Mexican market to American-based
telecommunications providers. 6 To date, long dis-
tance calls between the United States and Mexico
amount to nearly three billion minutes annually;
Americans spent $1.2 billion calling Mexico in
1999. 7 After three years in the supposedly compet-
itive Mexican market, however, the combined
market share for U.S. companies and subsidiaries
was less than 30 percent.8 Not only does Telmex
control 81 percent of the Mexican long distance
market and monopolize the local telecommunica-
tions market, it also has the highest profit return
commitments are colloquially referred to as the WTO Basic
Telecom Agreement. Id.
4 See generally, Telmex, at http://www.telmex.com (last
visited Oct. 12, 2001). Telmex is a telecommunications com-
pany located in Mexico City, Mexico that was formerly owned
by the Mexican Government but privatized in 1990. The
company provides telecommunications services that include
local and long-distance wire service, wireless communica-
tions, audio and data, digital wireless network access and In-
ternet. Id.
5 Mary Greczyn, U.S. Taking Mexican Interconnection Con-
cerns to WO, COMM. DAILY, July 31, 2000. The decision to
seek involvement of the WTO came after Deputy U.S. Trade
Representative Richard Fisher spoke with Mexican Deputy
Trade Minister for Commercial & International Negotiations
Luis de la Calle and Jorge Nicolin, head of Mexican regula-
tory agency, Cofetel. Id.
6 See Anthony DePalma, U.S. Taking Mexico Phone Dispute
to WT.O., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2000, at C6 [hereinafter
DePalma].
7 Jonathan Kandell, Yo Quiero Todo Bell, WIRED,Jan. 2001,
at 134.
8 Id. at 134. In 1999, Telmex registered profits of $3.9
billion on revenue of $10.2 billion. Id.
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per line of any major telecommunications carrier
in the world.9
Although this first WTO telecommunications
dispute concerns Mexico and the U.S., the out-
come of this case could establish an important
WTO precedent. As the first challenge under the
Basic Telecom Agreement, the dispute may re-
solve ambiguities over how that agreement is in-
terpreted by the WTO. Moreover, the case signals
to other countries that the U.S. government will
go to great lengths to enforce WTO agreements
against other WTO members. The Mexico-U.S.
telecommunications case may, and arguably
should, become a prototype for a new type of
WTO telecommunications case.
This Note explores the implications of the first
telecommunications case to be brought to the
WTO for dispute resolution. Part I of this note ex-
plains the history and practical implications of the
General Agreement on Trade in Services
("GATS") and the Basic Telecom Agreement. In
particular, this Note explains why WTO countries
decided to regulate telecommunications in this
way. Part II charts the course of the Mex-
ico-United States dispute. Part III discusses the is-
sues in this dispute that have already been re-
solved. Part IV analyzes the issues still confronting
the WTO in this dispute. Finally, Part IV of this
Note suggests how the WTO Dispute Settlement
Body might resolve the issues raised in this dis-
pute.
9 See DePalma, supra note 6, at C6.
10 Kevin C. Kennedy, Market Openings in the Telecommuni-
cations Goods and Services Sectors, 33 INT'L LAw. 27, 28 (1999)
[hereinafter Kennedy].
11 Id. at 28. By that time the service sector had taken over
manufacturing as the most important part of developed
countries' economies. Services industries accounted for sixty-
one percent of GDP and over one-half of employment in de-
veloped countries. The Manufacturing Myth, ECONOMIST, Mar.
19, 1994, at 91.
12 See Taunya L. McLarty, Liberalized Telecommunications
Trade in the WfO: Implications for Universal Service Policy, 51
FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 59 (1998) [hereinafter McLarty].
13 See ICSID, THE WORLD BANK GROUP, Vol. 15, 2, at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/news/n-1 5-2-5.htm (last
visited Sept. 19, 2001).
14 Kennedy, supra note 10, at 29. The ratio of world mer-
chandise trade to services trade was nearly four to one in
1997. See also FOCUS (WTO NEWSLETTER), Mar. 1998, No. 28
II. HISTORY
A. The General Agreement on Trade in
Services
The 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade ("GATT") dealt almost exclusively with
trade in goods.10 The GATT was both an organiza-
tion of sovereign states and an agreement. For the
first fifty years of GATT's existence, parties
worked to reduce barriers to international trade
in goods but largely ignored trading in services. 1"
As a result of the Uruguay Round, the WTO in-
herited the GATT's functions in 1995. The WTO
is an international body that administers trade
laws and provides a forum for settling trade dis-
putes between member countries.1 2 Although the
WTO now operates a dispute resolution process,
it has more power to enforce agreements among
member countries than did the GATT. These en-
forcement powers include the authority to impose
sanctions on a country that refuses to comply with
a WTO-sponsored agreement.' 3
Although trade in goods had been the principal
focus of the GATT prior to the Uruguay Round,
developed countries had previously decided that
it would be useful to negotiate an agreement gov-
erning trade in services given that they enjoyed a
comparative advantage in that sector.' 4 Overall,
trade in services, including the telecommunica-
tions and financial services,' 5 represented a sub-
stantial portion of total world trade. 16 Liberalized
trade in services between countries would provide
advantages to overall international trading. 1 7 Ulti-
mately, trade in services was added to the Uru-
guay Round agenda and an agreement called the
at http//www.wto.org/english/rese/focusse/focus28-e.pdf
[hereinafter Focus]. The WTO estimates that world trade in
commercial services exceeded $1.3 trillion in 1997. Id. Jobs
in the service sector provide nearly eighty percent of U.S. em-
ployment. That figure is expected to increase to approxi-
mately eighty-eight percent by 2005. Id.
15 Kennedy, supra note 10, at 29-30.
16 Id. at 29. The service sector created seventy-five per-
cent of GDP in the United States in 1996. Bob Vastine, Good
News for U.S. Trade, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 17, 1997, at
18. In 1997, total U.S. exports of commercial services ex-
ceeded $230 billion. See also Focus, supra note 14, at 6.
17 In extending the President's fast-track negotiating au-
thority under the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act
of 1988, Congress identified liberalization of trade in services
as a principle negotiating objective. Section 1101(b)(9) of
the 1998 Act provides in part:
the principle trade negotiating objectives of the United
States regarding trade in services are: to reduce or to
[Vol. 10
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General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
was signed after the Uruguay Round.1 8
In adopting the GATS, countries agreed for the
first time to rules governing trade and investment
in services. 19 The GATS encompasses multilateral
rules concerning treatment of foreign service and
service suppliers as well as government regula-
tions of trade in services. 20 The GATS agreement
is divided into three main sections: (1) basic obli-
gations, (2) market access and national treatment
commitment and (3) annexes to the general rules
on market access. 2 1 First, the agreement estab-
lishes basic obligations governing trade in services
applicable to all WTO members, which include
eliminate barriers to, or other distortions of, interna-
tional trade in services, including barriers that deny na-
tional treatments and restrictions on establishment and
operations in such markets; and to develop internation-
ally agreed rules, including dispute settlement proce-
dures which: are consistent with the commercial policies
of the United States and will reduce or eliminate such
barriers or distortions, and help ensure fair, equitable
opportunities for foreign markets.
19 U.S.C. §2901(b) (9)(A) (1994).
18 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1B, 33 I.L.M. 44, 77-78 (1994) [herein-
after GATS]. Texts of all WTO agreements are available from
the WTO's website at http://www.wto.org.
19 Kennedy, supra note 10, at 32.
20 See GATS, supra note 18.
21 Id. The GATS is divided into seven parts, consisting of
twenty-nine articles, eight annexes and one appendix. Id.
22 GATS, supra note 18, at art. XVII. This is a nondiscrim-
inatory rule that requires a WTO Member to treat like ser-
vices and service suppliers from other WTO Members no less
favorably than it treats its own services and suppliers. Article
XVII states that:
[I]n the sectors inscribed in its schedule and subject to
any conditions and qualifications set out therein, each
Member shall accord to services and service suppliers of
any other Member, in respect of all measures affecting
the supply of services, treatment no less favorable than
that it accords to its own like services and service suppli-
ers.
Id.
23 GATS, supra note 18, at art. II. Members must accord
equal treatment (i.e., most-favored-nation treatment) to all
other Members (Section 1 for Most-Favored-Nation Treat-
ment). Trade in services spans a wide range of fields, how-
ever, and these contain many measures that cannot be sub-
ject to most-favored-nation treatment for various historical or
other reasons. Accordingly, the GATS stipulates that if such
measures are registered at the time the GATS enters into
force, those measures may be exempted from the obligation
of most-favored-nation treatment. The Council for Trade in
Services shall review all exemptions granted for a period of
more than five years. The first such review shall take place no
more than five years after the entry into force of the WTO
Agreement. In principle, such exemptions should not exceed
a period of ten years. These exemptions are subject to negoti-
national treatment, 22 most-favored-nation treat-
ment ("MFN") 23 and transparency. 24 Second, the
GATS establishes WTO members' market access
commitments. 25 Each country adopted a schedule
of commitments that is attached to the Agree-
ment.26 Third, there are eight annexes that bal-
ance the basic obligations and market access com-
mitments of all signatories.2 7 Members must guar-
antee that any measures taken by central, regional
and local authorities, and by non-governmental
bodies2 8 that affect a service supplier's ability to
supply services through one of the forms, are in
accordance with GATS.2 9 Members are exempt,
however, from applying GATS obligations to those
ation in subsequent trade liberalizing rounds. Id.
24 GATS, supra note 18, at art. III, para. 1. The trans-
parency obligations do not override the need to protect con-
fidential information. Article III provides that no Member is
required to provide confidential information the disclosure
of which would impede law enforcement, be otherwise con-
trary to the public interest or prejudice legitimate commer-
cial interests of particular public or private enterprises. Id. at
art. III., para. 2.
25 GATS, supra note 18, at art. XVI. This provision re-
quires WTO members to "accord services and service suppli-
ers of any other [WTO] Member treatment no less favorable
than that provided for under the terms, limitations and con-
ditions agreed and specified in its schedule," and to refrain
from imposing certain types of quantitative restrictions, eco-
nomic needs tests or local incorporation requirements in
those service sectors where the WTO Member has under-
taken specific market access commitments. Id. A "quantita-
tive restriction" is a cap on the number of permitted suppli-
ers. An "economic needs test" is a limitation on the number
of service suppliers based on an assessment of whether the
market will be able to absorb new service suppliers without
providing harmful to existing ones. Id.
26 CATS, supra note 18, at art. II, para 1.
27 CATS, supra note 18, at art XX. Each WTO Member
negotiates a Schedule of Commitments covering the various
service sectors. If a WTO Member agrees to make market ac-
cess commitments in given service, that Member must list
quantitative restrictions and discrimination in favor of do-
mestic firms that it wishes to maintain. Id. According to Arti-
cle XIX, such restriction or discrimination is subject to nego-
tiations during either the original negotiations or subsequent
rounds. Id. at art. XIX.
28 GATS, supra note 18, at art. I., para. 3(a). The non-
governmental bodies must be acting with the delegated
power of the government. Id.
29 GATS, supra note 18, at art. XXVIII(c). "[M]easures by
Members affecting trade in services" is defined by GATS to
encompass measures with regard to:
the purchase, payment or use of a service; the access to
and use of, in connection with the supply of a service,
services which are required by those Members to be of-
fered to the public generally; and the presence, includ-
ing commercial presence, of persons of a Member for





service suppliers that are supplying the service "in
the exercise of governmental authority."30
1. Basic Obligations
For basic obligations, Article II of the GATS re-
quires that Members "accord immediately and un-
conditionally to services and service suppliers of
any other Member, treatment no less favorable
than that it accords to like services and service
suppliers of any other country."3' This obligation
is referred to as the "most favored nation" re-
quirement. Under the MFN obligation, all coun-
tries must allow service providers from different
countries non-discriminatory access to their mar-
kets. 32 For instance, MFN requires the U.S. to be
country-neutral to all W O members that want to
provide services in the U.S. market, regardless of
30 GATS, supra note 18, at art. 1, para. 3(b). The GATS
states, though, that measures affecting trade in services must
conform to GATS obligations when the measures would
cover a governmental supplier that is either supplying the
services on a commercial basis or supplying the service in
competition with another supplier. Id. at art. 1, para. 3(c).
Therefore, under the parties' negotiations of basic telecom-
munications services, this provision would subject PTT to
GATS principles unless the parties specifically exempted
their domestic PTT from the obligations.
31 GATS, supra note 18, at art. II, para. 1.
32 McLarty, supra note 12, at 23.
33 TRADE DIRECTORATE TRADE COMMITTEE, TRADE AND IN-
VESTMENT INTERFACE, TD/TC/WP(96)(32), at http://
www.oecd.org/ech/index-2.htm, Aug. 6, 1996 [hereinafter
Trade Directorate]. MFN exceptions have been inscribed in
roughly six out of ten country schedules submitted by GATS
signatories (i.e., with sixty-one schedules out of a total of 106
featuring MFN exceptions). Such MFN exceptions have been
claimed for some 350 measures. In virtually all cases, listed
measures do not have a fixed termination date. The bulk of
the MFN exemptions have been lodged in a relatively small
number of sectors, and these are typically sectors in which
few or no commitments were made in the Uruguay Round.
Indeed, for the most part, MFN exemptions tend not to be
lodged in sectors where negotiations on specific commit-
ments have been finalized. Id. at 2, 9.
34 See, e.g., http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/
minist.e/min99_e/engish/aboute/09serv e.htm (last vis-
ited Sept. 23, 2001). MFN applies to all services, but some
special temporary exemptions have been allowed. When the
GATS came into force, a number of countries already had
preferential agreements in services that they had signed with
trading partners, either bilaterally or in small groups. WTO
members felt it was necessary to maintain these preferences
temporarily. They gave themselves the right to continue giv-
ing more favorable treatment to particular countries in par-
ticular services activities by listing "MFN exemptions" along-
side their first sets of commitments. In order to protect the
general MFN principle, the exemptions could only be made
once; nothing could be added to these lists. They were re-
viewed in 2000 and should last no more than 10 years. Id.
the level of openness of those countries' markets
to U.S. service providers. 33 Countries violate MFN
principles for telecommunications if, for instance,
they act discriminatorily when granting intercon-
nection rights.3 4 Thus, all WTO members that
made basic telecommunications commitments
must confer the benefits of those commitments
on an MFN basis to all other WTO members re-
gardless of those members' participation in basic
telecommunications negotiations. 35 The MFN
provision in GATS can be exempted. 36 All coun-
tries must guarantee MFN treatment in all service
sectors,3 7 but they are authorized to accord partic-
ular countries less than MFN treatment as long as
they list these exemptions in their MFN Article II
Schedule in accordance with the requirements of
the Annex on Article II Exceptions.
38
Another basic obligation and a core principle
35 CATS, supra note 18, at art. I. The structure of the
GATS itself creates the classic "free-rider" problem. A Party
can take an MFN exception. This exception is taken for a
particular telecommunications sector and not with regard to
another Party; although this is not looked upon favorably.
For example, the United States was concerned about Ca-
nada's level of openness to U.S. investors in Canadian satel-
lite services. Therefore, the United States took an MFN ex-
ception for direct satellite broadcasting, generally, as op-
posed to taking an exception for Canada. Id.; McLarty, supra
note 12, at n.102.
36 GATS, supra note 18, at art. II, para. 2.
37 Id at para. 1. MFN reservations should be distin-
guished from market access and national treatment reserva-
tions. MFN treatment must be accorded to all listed and un-
listed sectors unless the MFN exemption is taken. However,
market access and national treatment must only be accorded
to those listed sectors, and even then particular reservations
can be taken. Id.
38 GATS, Annex on Article II Exemptions, Apr. 15, 1994,
WTO Agreement, The Results of the Uruguay Round of Mul-
tilateral Trade: the Legal Texts 352, para. 1 (GATT Secreta-
riat 1994), 33 I.L.M. 44, 68 (1994) [hereinafter CATS An-
nex]. The individual Member's Schedule on Article II ex-
emptions became an integral part of the Annex on Article I1
Exemptions. Id. Any new MFN exemptions after the date of
entry into force of GATS will have to be taken in accordance
with the waiver procedures of Article IX, para. 3 of the WTO
Agreement. WTO Agreement, supra note 2; see GATS Annex,
at para. 2. In that case, a three-fourths vote by the WTO
Members in favor of the MFN exemption would have to be
obtained by the exempting Member. WTO Agreement, supra
note 1, at art. IX, para. 3(a); see GATS Annex, at para. 3. Such
exemptions apply to a narrow range of sectors. Moreover,
these sectors are ones in which recent attempts at trade and
investment liberalization have encountered recurring diffi-
culties regardless of negotiating setting or where the appeal
of bilateralism and reciprocity-based approaches remains for
policy or practical reasons the preferred route to liberaliza-
tion and/or trade facilitation. Finally, it bears recalling that
the GATS Annex on Article II Exemptions stats that MFN ex-
emptions should not in principle exceed a period of ten
[Vol. 10
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of the GATS is transparency. 39 Article III requires
that each Member publish all international agree-
ments that affect trade in services as well as "all
relevant [domestic] measures of general applica-
tion, which pertains to or affect" the provision of
services. 40 The Members must also notify the
Council for Trade in Services about any new mea-
sures that "significantly affect trade in services."
4 1
Members, however, are not obligated to publish
any information that is confidential, and this
loophole is taken advantage of at any possible
point.
42
Article VI set out the specifications for Mem-
bers to identify and negotiate the reduction of
specific service sector non-tariff barriers, such as
criteria for licensing, 43 anti-competitive business
practices44 and activities of monopoly providers.
45
Article VI requires Members to ensure that "mea-
sures of general application affecting trade in ser-
vices are administered in a reasonable, objective
and impartial manner."4 6 In addition, it requires
that licensing schemes or other such qualification
requirements are administered in a manner fair
to the applicants 47 and puts in place, when practi-
cable, a mechanism for review of administrative
decisions that affect a provider's ability to supply
services.
48
As part of the basic obligations, "granting a mo-
nopoly share of a service market to a domestic
supplier is generally inconsistent with the goal of
market liberalization, but such practice is com-
years following the W'TO's entry into force. Such exemptions
are to be reviewed within five years of the entry into force
and be the subject of negotiations in subsequent liberaliza-
tion rounds. GATS Annex, at art. III.
'9 GATS, supra note 18, at art. Il.
40 Id. at art. III, para. 1. See McLarty, supra note 12, at 25.
41 GATS, supra note 18, at para. 3.
42 Id. at art. III.
43 Id. at art. VII.
44 Id. at art IX.
45 Id. at art. VIII, para. 2. A "monopoly supplier of a ser-
vice" is "any person, public or private, which in the relevant
market of the territory of a Member is authorized or estab-
lished formally or in effect by that Member as the sole sup-
plier of that service." Id. at art. XXVIII (h). Also, the obliga-
tions on any "monopoly supplier of a service" apply as well to
those "exclusive service suppliers, where a Member, formally
or in effect, (a) authorizes or establishes a small number of
service suppliers and (b) substantially prevents competition
among those suppliers in its territory." Id. at art. VIII, para. 5.
46 GATS, supra note 18, at art. VI, para. 1.
47 Id. at paras. 3, 5(a). When determining whether a
Member's licensing and qualification requirements or tech-
nical standards are being used to nullify a commitment, stan-
dards of international organizations will be considered, as
mon for the basic telecommunications service sec-
tor."49 Although the signatories to the GATS rec-
ognized that the "elimination of monopoly suppli-
ers in these sectors is a decision that individual
countries should have the right to make based on
their national objectives and their domestic anti-
competition policy, they committed not to let
these monopolies become an additional bar-
rier. '50 Therefore, the GATS permits monopolies
to stay in place, but subjects their operation to
certain obligations.5' Any monopoly supplier of a
service 52 must, within its relevant market of mo-
nopolization, comply with the Members' general
obligations and specific sector commitments.
53
Outside its monopolized market, the monopoly
supplier must not abuse its monopoly position or
act inconsistently with any of the Members' com-
mitments.
54
2. Market Access and National Treatment
For the General Obligations discussed above,
Members are bound by the principles for all ser-
vice sectors, unless otherwise accepted within
their Schedules, which is not commonly per-
formed.55 By contrast, with GATS Specific Com-
mitments-market access and national treat-
ment-Members are bound only if they make an
affirmative commitment in their Schedule to be
bound.
5 6
The market access commitment compliments
well as the disciplines on standards that are established by
bodies of the Council on Trade in Services. Id. at paras. 4,
5(b).
48 GATS, supra note 18, at art. VII, para. 2.
49 McLarty supra note 12, at 27.
50 Id.
51 See generally, GATS Annex, supra note 38.
52 GATS Annex, supra note 38, at art. XXVIII (h). A "mo-
nopoly supplier of a service" is "any person, public or private,
which in the relevant market of the territory of a Member is
authorized or established formally or in effect by that Mem-
ber as the sole supplier of that service." Also, the obligations
on any "monopoly supplier of a service" apply as well to those
"exclusive service suppliers, where a Member, formally or in
effect, (a) authorizes or establishes a small number of service
suppliers and (b) substantially prevents competition among
those suppliers in its territory." Id. at art. VIII, para. 5.
53 Id. at art. VIII, para. 1.
54 Id. at para. 2.
55 McLarty, supra note 12, at 27.
56 McLarty, supra note 12, at 21. But there are
various exceptions to the obligations that apply to all ser-
vice sectors, similar to exceptions contained in the
GATT], which are outlined in the GATS. There are differ-
ent than the sector-specific exemptions that Members
20021
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MFN and national treatment obligations within
the GATS Specific Commitments in several ways.
57
The principle states that a country should allow
the highest possible access to the telecommunica-
tions market, for instance, by not imposing cer-
tain quotas or quantitative restrictions. 58 Members
do not have to open their service markets to for-
eign service suppliers within Article XVI. 5 Article
XVI only states that when a "Member undertakes
sector-specific market access commitments in its
Schedule, they must be within certain parame-
ters."60 For instance, when a Member undertakes
market access for a service, it will be assumed that
there will not be any limits on the ability of a for-
eign service supplier to enter the domestic service
market.61
The principle of national treatment requires a
country to grant foreign service-providers treat-
ment no less favorable than it grants to its own
list in their Schedules. GATS includes institutional provi-
sions, such as authorization for dispute settlement. Fi-
nally, GATS contains commitments to continue negotia-
tions on various issues important to all services.
Id.
57 Id. at 28-29.
The market access principle applies to services differ-
ently than it does to goods. Under GATT, market access
encourages tariffication, which is the transfer of non-
tariff barriers into tariff barriers, and then it requires the
overall reduction or phasing out of tariffs. This principle
applies easily to goods, and specifically to telecommuni-
cations equipment, as unreasonable packing require-
ments, content requirements, technical standards, and
so on, may be set up by a country as trade barriers.
These barriers can be quantified in tariff schedules, and
as the country's market becomes more competitive, the
tariffs can be reduced. Market access, as applied to ser-
vices, includes allowing a country to provide services
through four modes of supply in Article I, such as cross-
border supply and commercial presence abroad. Thus,
market access is one of the most important and pervasive
issues facing service providers.
Id.
58 Id. at 28-29.
This principle applies easily to goods, and specifically to
telecommunications equipment, as unreasonable pack-
ing requirements, content requirements, technical stan-
dards, and so on, may be set up by a country as trade
barriers. These barriers . . . can be quantified in tariff
schedules, and as the country's market becomes more
competitive, the tariffs can be reduced. Market access, as
applied to services, includes allowing a country to pro-
vide services through four modes of supply in Article I,
such as cross-border supply and commercial presence
abroad. Thus, market access is one of the most impor-
tant and pervasive issues facing service providers.
Id.
59 McLarty, supra note 12, at 29.
60 Id. "Before the conclusion of the 1997 Negotiations,
Members' individual market access concessions were fairly
domestic service suppliers. 62 For basic telecom-
munications, this means that foreign suppliers
must have the opportunity to receive the same ac-
cess to the public networks as a national provider,
regardless of whether that provider is public or
private. 63 In GATS, unlike in GATT, the national
treatment requirements are not mandatory. 64 A
country has to undertake the national treatment
commitments in its Schedule in order to be
bound and a Member can specify conditions or
qualifications to such commitments.
65
If there are problems with any of the obliga-
tions within the GATS, Articles XXII and XXIII
within the GATS provide consultation and dispute
settlement provisions. 66 If a Member believes that
another Member is violating one of its obligations
in the GATS framework, one of the Annexes or in
its Schedule of Commitments, then that Member
can invoke the dispute settlement procedure
narrow for the telecommunications sector. [But], market ac-
cess for basic telecommunications is now required for those
Members that made February 15, 1997 offers." Id.; see GATS,
supra note 18, at art. XVI.
61 GATS, supra note 18, at art. XVI, para (a)-(f).
62 Id. at art. XVII.
63 Id. at para. 1. However, the Note records that the na-
tional treatment commitments should "not be construed to
require any Member to compensate for any inherent compet-
itive disadvantages which result from foreign character of the
relevant services or service suppliers." Id. at n.l. This is
noted, surely, because of the difference between goods,
which are generally fungible, and services, which carry with
them more personal and tailorable characteristics that a do-
mestic service provider may be more cognizant of with regard
to domestic consumers. Id.
64 GATS, supra note 18, at art. XVII. National treatment
will mean something different for countries in which the gov-
ernment is a market participant in addition to the market
regulator. Even as a market participant, the government, in
theory, should apply all international laws, regulations, taxes
and standards neutrally among all market participants. If the
government taxed other providers, would it have to tax itself?.
There are serious implications to the application of national
treatment in a market that is dominated by a government-
operated service provider that is supplying services on a com-
mercial basis or supplying the service in competition with an-
other supplier. Id. at art I, para. 3 (b).
65 GATS, supra note 18, at art. XVII, para. 1. So, for ex-
ample, if a government commits itself to allow foreign banks
to operate in its domestic market, that is a market access
commitment. In addition, if the government limits the num-
ber of licenses it will issue, then that is a market access limita-
tion. If it also says foreign banks are only allowed one branch
while domestic banks are allowed numerous branches, this is
an exception to the national treatment principle. See WTO,
Official Ministerial Website, at http://www.wto.org/english/
thewtoe/ministe/min99_e/english/aboute/
09serv-e.htm (last visited Jun. 30, 2001).
66 GATS, supra note 18, at art. XXII, XXIII.
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under the WTO. 67 Article XXIII, however, only
provides a basic outline of authority; it does not
establish the procedural formalities for dispute
settlement.68 The current rights and obligations
are set out in the Dispute Settlement Understand-
ing (DSU) of the WTO, which is referenced by
GATS, Article XXIII.
69
Over many years, Members have made changes
to the dispute resolution process70 that indicate
their willingness to take more of a legal rather
than diplomatic approach. Some of the changes
included the right for Members have recourse to
the Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB") without the
ability of one party to block panel formation,
71
without the consensus requirement that applied
before 1994,72 with strict time limitations 73 with
the right to appeal,7 4 with the possibility of a
cross-retaliation remedy,75 and with the option of
arbitration on the issue of retaliation.
76
67 Id. at art. XXIII, para. 1 "If any Member should con-
sider that any other Member fails to carry out its obligations
or specific commitments under... [GATS], it may with a view
to reaching a mutually satisfactory resolution of the matter,
have recourse to the... [Dispute Settlement Understand-
ing]." Id.
68 Id. at art. XXIII.
69 Understanding the Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement,
Annex 2, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILAT-
ERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS 404, 33 I.L.M.
1125, 1226 (1994). [hereinafter 1994 Dispute Settlement Un-
derstanding].
70 McLarty, supra note 12, at 37. The Tokyo Round pro-
duced the Understanding Regarding Notification, Consulta-
tion, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance. GAIT B.I.S.D.
(26th Supp.) at 210 (1980). Later, in 1982, The GATT Minis-
terial Declaration on Dispute Settlement was released. GATT
B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) at 13 (1983).
71 1994 Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note
69, at art. IV. The DSB must establish a panel no later than
the second time it considers a panel request, unless there is
consensus against establishment. Id.
72 Id. at art. XXI. A Member can no longer block adop-
tion of a panel report, authorization of retaliation or time
limitations for each step. The panel report has to be adopted
by the DSB between 20 and 60 days after circulation to Par-
ties unless a Party appeals or there is a consensus not to
adopt the report. Parties can state in writing their objections
to the report, but this will not have the effect of unilaterally
blocking the report. Id.
73 Id. Overall, it is now possible to adopt a panel report
within 14 months or less. Id.
74 1994 Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note
69, at art. 17. Either party is authorized to make an appeal to
the Appellate Body. The appeal is limited to issues of law cov-
ered in the panel report, and the DSB must adopt the Appel-
late Report within 30 days unless there is a consensus not to
adopt the report. The total time for the appeal is not to ex-
ceed 90 days. Id.
3. GATS Annex on Telecommunications
Within the area of services, telecommunications
is a sector with a dual function, because it is a
means of economic- activity and the means of de-
livery for other economic activity.77 Due to this
complex role of the telecommunications sector,
the GATS Annex on Telecommunications was es-
tablished as a way to ensure that the telecommu-
nications sector would not become a non-tariff
barrier to trade and instead serve as a means of
services delivery. 78 The Annex gives service prov-
iders reasonable and nondiscriminatory access to,
and use of, telecommunications services within
the borders of WTO members that have made
commitments for value-added services. 79 This
translates into the ability of foreign value-added
service providers to enter a country and intercon-
nect to the public telecommunications network
75 Id. This is a significant addition to the 1994 agree-
ment. The Multilateral Trade Agreements have been "pack-
aged," and a Member that accedes to the WTO must accede
to each agreement, including GATS. The preferred retalia-
tory action is within the same agreement and the same sec-
tor, such as among types of telecommunications services. If
this is not possible, then retaliation may be effected within
the same agreement but in a different sector, such as be-
tween telecommunications and financial services. Then, if
those two alternatives are not possible, retaliation can be au-
thorized within a different agreement, such as between tele-
communication services and goods. Id.
76 1994 Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note
69, at art. 25. The findings of arbitration are to be adopted by
the DSB and implemented unless the DSB rejects by consen-
sus the arbitration findings. The arbitration process is availa-
ble only for the issue of when a Party must comply with panel
and DSB recommendations. It is not for the issue of whether
the Party is ultimately liable to comply with the recommenda-
tions because "liability," or noncompliance under the terms
of the GATT, is locked in by adoption of an unfavorable
panel or appellate report. Id.
77 Kennedy, supra note 10, at 33.
78 Id at 34. The Annex applies to all measures that affect
access to and use of public telecommunication transport net-
works and services. It does not apply to measures affecting
cable or broadcast distribution of radio or television pro-
gramming. Public telecommunications transport service
means service that a member requires to be offered to the
public generally (thus, they may be privately owned), and in-
cludes telegraph, telephone, telex and data transmission.
Public telecommunication transport network means the in-
frastructure, which permits telecommunications between de-
fined network termination points. CATS Annex, supra note
38 at 3(a), (c).
79 Statement of Administrative Action, Apr. 15, 1994,
WTO Agreement, reprinted in, Uruguay Round Agreements




for the purpose of offering value-added services to
the public in that market.80
All measures that concern the access and use of
public telecommunications transport services are
included within the GATS Annex on Telecommu-
nications."' There are no requirements that a
member authorize a service supplier of any mem-
ber country to acquire, construct, establish or oth-
erwise supply telecommunication transport net-
works or services unless there is a scheduled spe-
cific commitment concerning access or use of
these services.8 2 In addition, where there are tele-
communication services that are not offered to
the public generally, there are no requirements
that a member must acquire, build or lease a net-
work or supply these telecommunication ser-
vices.8 3
Paragraph five of the Annex is the nucleus of
the entire agreement: "Access to and Use of Pub-
lic Telecommunications Transport Networks and
Services. ' '84 This paragraph provides that "each
Member shall ensure that any service supplier of
any other Member is accorded access to and use
of public telecommunications transport networks
and services on reasonable and non-discrimina-
tory terms and conditions, for the supply of a ser-
vice included in this Schedule."8 5 This includes
(1) the right to purchase or lease and attach ter-
minal or other equipment that is necessary to sup-
ply services; (2) the right to interconnect private
or leased or owned circuits with public networks
or services; (3) the right to use operating proto-
cols of the supplier's choice in the supply of any
service; and (4) the right to use networks and ser-
vices for the movement of interconnection within
and across borders, subject to reasonable mea-
80 McLarty supra note 12, at 38. Value-added services, or
telecommunications for which suppliers "add value" to the
customer's information by enhancing its form or content or
by providing for its storage and retrieval, were not formally
part of the extended negotiations. Nevertheless, a few partici-
pants chose to include them in their offers. Examples in-
clude on-line data processing, on-line data base storage and
retrieval, electronic data interchange, e-mail or voice
mail. WTO, Defining Basic Telecommunications, at http://
www.wto.org/english/tratope/servtee/te 102_e.htm.
81 See GATS Annex, supra note 38.
82 Id. at para. 2.3.1.
83 Id. at para. 2.3.2.
84 Id. at para. 5. A footnote clarifies that the term "non-
discriminatory" refers to MFN and national treatment as de-
fined in the GATS. Id. at para. 5.1 n.16. It adds that sector-
specific usage of the term means "terms and conditions no
less favorable than those accorded to any other user of like
public telecommunications transport networks or service
sures necessary to ensure security and confidenti-
ality.8 6
Any sector-specific commitments on market ac-
cess or national treatment must be in a member's
Schedule.8 7 By listing a service sector in its Sched-
ule, a member makes a commitment to allow for-
eign suppliers into its market and to treat them as
its domestic suppliers.8 Once a member makes a
commitment in its Schedule, it cannot be with-
drawn unless the commitment was one that did
not benefit any other member or the withdrawing
member gives a compensatory adjustment. This
process is seen where there is a benefit withdrawn
under Article XXI, the Modification of Sched-
ules. 89
B. Specific Commitments
All the commitments described above were
made as part of the Uruguay Round negotiations
officially concluded in 1994.90 Unfortunately, the
Uruguay Round was unable to resolve certain dif-
ferences over basic telecommunications services. 91
As stated earlier, service trade accounts for a sub-
stantial portion of world trade today. Within this
market, basic telecommunications account for
about eighty-five percent of the trade in telecom-
munication services altogether and enhanced ser-
vices account for the rest.92 Basic services are
"voice and non-voice services consisting of the
transmission of information between points speci-
fied by a user in which the information delivered
by the telecommunications agency to the recipi-
ent is identical in form and content to the infor-
mation received by the telecommunications
agency from the user." ''9 Enhanced services are
under like conditions." Id. This language strongly suggests
that no derogations from the MFN or national treatment ob-
ligations may be listed in a Member's schedule of commit-
ments regarding access to or use of public telecommunica-
tion networks or services. Id.
85 Id. at para. 5.1.
86 Compare GATS Annex, supra note 38, at paras. 5.3-5.5
with GATS, supra note 18, at art. Ill.
87 GATS, supra note 18, at art. XX.
88 Ild.
89 Id. at art. XXI, para. 2(a).
90 McLarty, supra note 12, at 21.
91 Id. at 9. The Members were not ready in 1994 to make
commitments on "basic telecommunications services" be-
cause, unlike enhanced services, the supply of basic services
has been by state-owned operators or state-sanctioned mo-
nopolies. Id.
92 Kennedy, supra note 10, at 36.
93 Jonathan David Aronson & Peter F. Cowhey, When
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those services in which the voice or non-voice of
information being transferred from one point to
another undergoes an end-to-end restructuring or
format change before it reaches the customer.
94
During the Uruguay Round negotiations, disputes
over regulatory environments and market open-
ings within the basic telecommunication services
were key differences between the United States
and other members. 95 While a decision on market
openings in the telecommunications sector was
unattainable, it was established that Members
should postpone a conclusion and negotiations
beyond the Uruguay Round.
96
As noted, the GATS required each country to
announce and adhere to a "Schedule of Commit-
ments. '9 7 In 1997, the GATS signatories finally an-
nounced their Schedules of Commitments.98 The
1997 Schedules of Commitments on basic services
included four basic sections: service sectors cov-
ered, limitations on market access, limitations on
national treatment and additional comments.99
For example, Mexico committed in its schedule
to market access and national treatment for all
services except for Mexican satellites in providing
Countries Talk: International Trade in Telecommunications Ser-
vices, 86 (1988). Resale of these services was also included. Id.
94 WTO Secretariat, The United States of America,
Schedule of Specific Commitments, GATS/SC/90, 94-1088,
II.C (Apr. 15, 1994). Enhanced services are defined as those
that "add value" to the consumer's transmission or informa-
tion by upgrading its form or content or by providing for its
storage and retrieval. The United States defines enhanced
services as: services, offered over common carrier transmis-
sion facilities (that is, public telecommunications transport
services) which employ computer processing applications
that: act on the format, content code, protocol or similar as-
pects of the subscriber's transmitted information or; provide
the subscriber additional, different or restructured informa-
tion; or involve subscriber interaction with stored informa-
tion. Id.
95 Kennedy, supra note 10, at 36.
96 GATS, supra note 18, at art. XXIV. The trade ministers
for each Member country were given more time and a Deci-
sion on Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications was is-
sued at the conclusion of the trading round. The postpone-
ment was contained in a Ministerial Decision on Negotiations
on Basic Telecommunications, The Results of the Uruguay
Round on Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Legal Texts
461 (GATT Secretariat 1994). Decisions were extended until
April 30, 1996 with the sponsorship of the Negotiating Group
on Basic Telecommunications and later extended again by
the Council on Trade in Services until February 15, 1997.
The Council for Trade in Services is composed of all WTO
Members and is charged with facilitating the operation of the
GATS and furthering its objectives. Id.
97 GATS, supra note 18.
98 McLarty, supra note 12, at 44.
99 Id. at 46-47.
domestic services until 2002; one hundred per-
cent foreign ownership for cellular services; 100
and 49 percent for all other services.' 10
The United States committed to market access
and national treatment for all services except di-
rect-to-home, 10 2 direct broadcast satellite' 0 3 and
digital auto transmission services, 0 4 with a limit of
20 percent direct foreign investment in radio li-
censes. 10 5 The U.S. also adopted the Reference
Paper and MFN exception for one-way satellite
transmission of direct-to-home, direct broadcast
satellite and digital audio transmission services.1
0 6
C. The Reference Paper
Attached to the WTO Basic Telecommunica-
tions Agreement are pro-competitive regulatory
principles (referred to as the "Reference Pa-
per").' 0 7 The Negotiating Group on Basic Tele-
communications drafted the Reference Paper in
order to formulate the core regulatory obligations
that would bring significant changes to trade in
telecommunication services. 108 Based on the U.S.
100 Laura B. Sherman, "Wildly Enthusiastic" About the First
Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Telecommunications Survives,
51 FED. COMM. L.J 61, 106 [hereinafter Sherman].
101 Mexico also adopted the Reference Paper, which will
be explained later in Section C of this paper.
102 Sherman, supra note 100, at 110.
103 Id. As an alternative to cable television, Direct Broad-
cast Satellite (DBS) is available. It provides cable-like televi-
sion programming directly from satellites on small satellite
dishes. Today, more than one in eight U.S. households sub-
scribes to DBS programming and that number will likely be
one in five in the next few years. Richard R. Peterson, Satellite
Television, A Consumer's Guide, Version 4, at http://
www.dbsforums.com/dbs/aO.html (July 20, 2000).
104 Sherman, supra note 100, at 110.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 See generally Reference Paper, Fourth Protocol to the
General Agreement on Trade in Services, 436 (WTO 1997)
36 I.L.M. 354, 367 (1997) [hereinafter Reference Paper].
The Reference Paper was never fully issued as a WTO docu-
ment. Id.
108 Sherman, supra note 100, at n.54.
This group was known as the "Room A Group," after the
room at the WTO where it first met. Subsequent meet-
ings, informally chaired by the chief Japanese delegate
to the NGBT, met at the Japanese Embassy. The hospi-
tality of the Japanese and informal leadership of the Jap-
anese "chair" contributed significantly to the successful
drafting of the Reference Paper. Initial participants rep-
resented the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Ja-
pan, Korea, and the European Union. Later sessions
were attended by representatives of Brazil, Singapore,
Chile, Mexico, and the Philippines, in addition to the
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Telecommunications Act of 1996,109 this paper
aimed at ensuring members put in place policies
that allow competition, which would permit trad-
ing partners to benefit from the negotiated con-
cessions.D10 Member countries believed that a new
regulatory approach was desirable because most
telecommunication regulations and laws did not
foster competitive markets and had been domi-
nated by the state-owned companies. I I In all,
fifty-five Members agreed to adopt the Reference
Paper. 112 Ten WTO members committed to
adopting either part or all of these principles in
the near future.' 13 Contained within the Refer-
ence Paper are interconnection provisions,'14
competition safeguards,1 5 transparency of licens-
ing criteria, 116 universal service policies, 1 7 inde-
pendence of the regulator principles and alloca-
tion of scarce resource principles.""
The Reference Paper includes numerous safe-
guards aimed at preventing national telecommu-
nication monopolies from exploiting their "domi-
nant position to distort market forces and impede
the ability of competitors to supply networks or
services for which commitments would be
made." 119 Furthermore, the agreement requires
the establishment of "independent" regulators re-
moved from the purview of the basic telecommu-
original participants.
Id.
109 Sherman, supra note 100, at 80; see generally 47 U.S.C.
§251 (1998).
110 GATS, Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunica-
tions, Review of Outstanding Issues, Note by the Secretariat,
TS/NGBT/W/2, para. 15 (July 8, 1994) available at http://
www.wto.org/wto/ddf/ep/public.html, (last visited July 7,
2001) [hereinafter Secretariat Note].
111 Sherman, supra note 100, at 71.
112 See In re Rules and Policies on Foreign Participation
in the U.S. Telecommuns. Mkt.; Mkt. Entry and Reg. of For-
eign-Affiliated Entities, 12 FCC Rcd. 23,891, 23,903, para. 27
(1997) [hereinafter Foreign Participation Order]. The Refer-
ence Paper was never formally issued as a WTO Document.
For a description of the Reference Paper see Sherman, supra
note 100, at 71-86.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 GATS, supra note 18 at art. VI.
116 Id. at art. Il.
117 Rebecca Beynon, The FCC's Implementation of the 1996
Act: Agency Litigation Strategies and Delay, 53 FED. COMM.L.J. 27,
47 n.51 (2000). "The term 'universal service' describes the
policy that all Americans should have access to affordable ba-
sic telephone service, regardless of whether they are low-in-
come, and regardless of whether they live in areas that are
expensive to serve (such as rural areas)." Id.
118 See Foreign Participation Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at
24,039 para. 340.
nication operators and assigned to a separate
body. 20 The Reference Paper did not decide
what entity will carry out the obligations con-
tained within it or how those obligations specifi-
cally will be carried out.
12 1
According to the Reference Paper, Members
are required to take appropriate measures in or-
der to prevent suppliers from engaging in or con-
tinuing anti-competitive practices. Members are
not required to guarantee that this conduct will
not occur or to stop such conduct. 22 The Refer-
ence Paper is different from other WTO accords
in that failure to adopt measures that would
thwart anti-competitive conduct warrants WIG ac-
tion settlement but failure to enforce these mea-
sures does not. 123
Negotiators also agreed that the section on in-
terconnection should cover all types of telecom-
munication services. 124 Within this section, mem-
bers are only obligated to make competitive those
services for which they have scheduled WTO com-
mitments. 25 These three obligations are ex-
tremely detailed and "will be ensured" 2 6 only at a
"technically feasible point"'127 in the network.
First, every major supplier must treat other tele-
communication services and suppliers as it treats
its own services and affiliated service suppliers, as
119 Sherman, supra note 100, at 71.
120 Secretariat Note, supra note 110, at para. 16.
121 Sherman, supra note 100, at 73. "Negotiators agreed
that the principles needed to be sufficiently flexible to ac-
commodate differences in market structures and regulatory
philosophies among various participants... The objective was
to ensure certain results, a level playing field for entrants, not
to determine the means by which the results would be
achieved." Id.
122 Reference Paper, supra note 107, at para. 1.1; see also
GATS, Annex on Telecommunications, para. 2.1 n.15 ("This
paragraph is understood to mean that each Member shall en-
sure that the obligations of this Annex are applied with re-
spect to suppliers to public telecommunications transport
networks and services by whatever measures are necessary.");
see also North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17,
1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., ch. 13, art. 1305, 32 I.L.M. 605, 655
(1993).
123 Sherman, supra note 100, at 77.
124 Reference Paper, supra note 107, at para 2.1.
125 Id. As with the definition of "essential facilities," the
interconnection obligation is aimed at providers of "public
telecommunications transport networks or services." Id.
126 Id. at para. 2.2.
127 Id. The interconnection obligations imposed on in-
cumbent local exchange carriers by the Telecommunications
Act of 1996 also apply at any technically feasible point within
the carrier's network. Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47
U.S.C. §251 (c) (2) (B) (1998).
[Vol. 10
United States v. Mexico
well as treat all nonaffiliated telecommunication
services equally and without discrimination.1
28
Second, interconnection must be timely, the
terms under which it is provided must be trans-
parent and reasonable, and rates must be cost-ori-
ented,1 29 transparent and reasonable.' 30 Negotia-
tors did not try to define the obligations imposed
by this section and felt that the meanings would
be determined in WTO dispute settlement pro-
ceedings.1 31 Finally, interconnection is subject to
charges that reflect the cost of construction of ad-
ditional facilities necessary when such facilities are
requested. 132 Negotiators knew there were cus-
tomary interconnection points typically available,
and as long as service suppliers were willing to pay
the supplementary cost, they could obtain inter-
connection at other points in the network.
1 33
With interconnection dispute setdement at the
WTO, negotiators agreed on the need for a do-
mestic enforcement mechanism and a time frame
in which interconnection had to be provided by
WTO members.13 4 This opportunity is separate
from WTO dispute settlement, where govern-
ments offer service suppliers an opportunity to ap-
peal administrative decisions made by WTO mem-
ber governments.' 35 Within the Reference Paper,
128 Reference Paper, supra note 107, at para. 2. This par-
agraph was based on the EU Interconnection Directive, 97/
33/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on
Interconnection in Telecommunications with regard to en-
suring universal service and interoperability through applica-
tion of the principles of Open Network Provision ("ONP"),
1997 O.J. (L 199) 32, arts. 6(a) and 7, para. 2, but was broad-
ened to define nondiscrimination by inserting the references
to treatment provided affiliates and non-affiliates. Id.
129 Reference Paper, supra note 107, at para. 2.2(b).
Negotiators decided to use "cost-oriented," instead of "cost-
based" because of the difficulty of determining actual costs in
most countries. United States negotiators also favored "cost-
oriented" because it is the term used in section 271 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996. 47 U.S.C. §271 (1998).
130 See generally In re Implementation of the Local Com-
petition Provisions in the Telecomms. Act of 1996; Intercon-
nection Between Local Exch. Carriers and Commercial Mo-
bile Radio Serv. Providers, First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd.
15499 (1996). This order established nationwide pricing
rules for interconnection between new entrants and incum-
bent local exchange carriers. Id. The scope for interpretation
of the interconnection obligations can vary. For one interpre-
tation see Coalition of Service Industries, Statement on the
WTO Group on Basic Telecommunications Reference Paper
(Oct. 1997), available at http://www.itu.int/intset/indu/
csi-stat.htm (last visited July 7, 2001).
131 Sherman, supra note 100, at 80. This wording comes
directly from article 7, paragraph 4 of the EU Interconnec-
tion Directive and also follows the Telecommunications Act,
so negotiators felt that interpretation of the words would be
a dispute settlement can be accomplished by any
"independent domestic body"' 136 (not only a regu-
lator)1 3v The domestic body is charged with
resolving disputes138 regarding conditions, rates
and terms. Disputes can be resolved on facts
presented to the domestic body or by reference to
terms, conditions or rates already established.
This must be done within a "reasonable period of
time."1 39
Paragraph five of the Reference Paper ad-
dresses regulatory independence and the poten-
tial for conflict of interest that might occur when
the regulator is also the major telecommunica-
tions operator.' 40 The Reference Paper requires
that the regulator be detached from, and not ac-
countable to, any telecommunications opera-
tor. 141 In addition, the regulator must be inde-
pendent of all market participants.
III. THE UNITED STATES V. MEXICO: THE
DEBATE
A. The Complaint
On-July 28, 2000, the United States Trade Rep-
resentative ("USTR") announced that the "United
precedents for interpretation within the WTO context. Direc-
tive 97/33/EC of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil on Interconnection in Telecommunications With Regard
to Ensuring Universal Ser4vice and Interoperability Through
Application of the Principles of Open Network Provision
(ONP), 1997 OJ. (L 199) 32 [hereinafter EU Interconnec-
tion Directive]. Id.
132 Reference Paper, supra note 107, para. 2.2 (c).
133 Id.
134 EU Interconnection Directive, supra note 131, at art.
9, para. 2.
135 Kennedy, supra note 10, at 11.
136 Sherman, supra note 100, at 82.
137 Reference Paper, supra note 107, at para. 2.5.
138 Id.
139 See Reference Paper, supra note 107, at para. 2.5(b).
As with the term used in paragraph 2.2, there is no definition
of a "reasonable" period of time. Some of the negotiators
noted, however, that the four years needed to resolve an in-
terconnection dispute between Telecom New Zealand and
the new entrant, Clear, was not reasonable. Id.
140 Id. at para. 5. The paragraph addresses the potential
for conflict of interest that arises when the body regulating
the telecommunications industry is also the major telecom-
munications operator. The text achieves part of the U.S. goal
for independence of the regulator. It requires that the regu-
lator be separate from, and not accountable to, any operator.
It does not require that the regulator be independent of any
government ministry. In fact, paragraph 5 allows the govern-
ment telecommunications ministry to be the regulator. Id.
141 See id. at para. 5.
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States [would] request [WTO] consultations with
Mexico regarding barriers to competition in Mex-
ico's $12 billion telecommunications market."' 42
Specifically, the United States sought resolution
of three issues of concern regarding commit-
ments Mexico undertook in the WTO under the
Basic Telecommunications Agreement.1 43 These
issues were: (1) lack of effective disciplines over
the former monopoly, Telmex, which uses its
dominant market position to thwart competition;
(2) failure to ensure timely, cost-oriented inter-
connection that would permit competing carriers
to connect to Telmex customers for local, long-
distance and international services; and (3) fail-
ure to permit alternatives to an outmoded system
of charging U.S. carriers above-cost rates for com-
pleting international calls into Mexico.'
44
B. Section 1377 Comments
USTR first became concerned about the tele-
communications regulatory environment in Mex-
ico after conducting several annual reviews of for-
eign countries' compliance with telecommunica-
tions trade agreements under Section 1377 of the
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988.145 Section 1377 requires the USTR to review
annually the operation and effectiveness of all
United States trade agreements regarding tele-
communications products and services. 14 6 The
purpose of this review is to determine whether
any act, policy or practice of a country that has
142 Press Release, United States Trade Representative,
US To Request WTO Consultations With Mexico Regarding
Telecommunications Trade Barriers, at http://www.ustr.gov
(July 28, 2000) [hereinafter July Press Release].
143 Id.; see Basic Telecom Agreement, supra note 1.
144 July Press Release, supra note 142, at 1. United States
Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky said that "[t]he
Mexican government had indicated its hopes to resolve many
of the issues over the next few months." Id. at 1.
145 Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §2411 (1996); see also
Press Release, United States Trade Representative, Annual
Review of Telecommunications Trade Agreements High-
lights Concerns Regarding Mexico, South Africa and Other
Countries, at http://www.ustr.gov (Apr. 4, 2000).
146 Trade Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. §1377 (1988).
147 19 U.S.C. §304(a)(1) (A). Retaliation is mandatory
and must be targeted at telecommunications products and
services of the foreign country involved, unless actions
against other economic sectors would be more effective in
achieving compliance with the agreement. Id.
148 Letter from AT&T to USTR regarding Section 1377
Request for Comments Concerning Compliance with Tele-
communication Trade Agreements, (Feb. 1, 2000) (on file
with USTR) at http:www.ustr.gov/efoia/1377/att2000.html
entered into a telecommunications trade agree-
ment with the United States: (1) is not in compli-
ance with the terms of such an agreement or (2)
otherwise denies (within the context of the terms
of such agreement) mutually advantageous mar-
ket opportunities to telecommunications prod-
ucts and services of U.S. firms in that foreign
country. An affirmative determination under Sec-
tion 1377 is considered a violation of a trade
agreement under Section 304(a)(1) (A) of the
Trade Act of 1974.147
WorldCom, AT&T and the Competitive Tele-
communications Association ("Comptel") filed
comments as part of the Section 1377 annual re-
view by USTR every year from 1998 until 2001
concerning Mexican compliance with telecommu-
nication trade agreements. 1 48 All of the com-
ments expressed concern about the inability of
U.S. carriers to obtain reasonable termination
charges for calls to Mexico and how this has
caused significant harm to many U.S. consum-
ers.' 
49
AT&T and WorldCom expressed their concerns
about Mexico's failure to allow fully open mar-
kets, as required by its WTO commitments, in
both international and domestic telecommunica-
tion services.1 50 As a supplier of cross-border ser-
vices to Mexico, these companies argued that they
were entitled under the WTO Reference Paper to
interconnect these services on non-discriminatory
terms and at cost-oriented rates at any technically
feasible point in Telmex's network. 15 Moreover,
[hereinafter AT&T Letter]. See Letter from Comptel to USTR
regarding Section 1377 Request for Comments Review for
Mexico (Mar. 29, 1999) (on file with USTR) at http://
www.ustr.gov/enforcement/comp.pdf. [hereinafter Comptel
Letter]. Letter from WorldCom to USTR regarding Section
1377 Request for Comments Concerning Compliance with
Telecommunication Trade Agreements, (Jan. 26, 2001) (on
file with USTR) at http//www.ustr.gov/enforcement/
worldcom.pdf [hereinafter WorldCom Letter].
149 Id.; see also AT&T Letter, supra note 148, at 2.
150 WorldCom Letter, supra note 148, at 2; AT&T Letter,
supra note 148, at 2. "Two years after the effective date of the
WTO Agreement, Mexico has still failed to implement its
WTO Commitments requiring the removal of market access
barriers supporting the high settlement rates maintained by
Telmex." In addition, "Mexico has failed to establish a level
playing field required by its WTO Reference Paper commit-
ments and therefore does not allow the new carriers in Mex-
ico... to compete with Telmex on a fair and equal basis."
AT&T Letter, supra note 148, at 5-6.
15' AT&T Letter, supra note 148, at 6. AT&T's affiliate,
Alestra, is "unfairly disadvantaged by the longstanding failure
of Cofetel, the Mexican regulator, to ensure that Telmex
does not abuse its market power in its dealing with its com-
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these two companies contended that Mexico's ful-
fillment of this obligation would substantially re-
duce the cost of U.S.-Mexico call termination.15
2
The companies expressed great concern about
the Mexican reguator, Cofetel's153 failure to en-
sure that Telmex's competitors may interconnect
with Telmex's network at any technically feasible
point under non-discriminatory terms 154 and at
cost-oriented rates.
155
The Section 1377 comments by AT&T and
WorldCom also expressed the belief that
Telmex's competitors are further disadvantaged
by the above-cost domestic interconnection rates
they must pay Telmex. Of particular concern were
the "so-called 'off-net' interconnection charges
that the competitive carriers pay to terminate
their customers' calls in geographic areas not yet
open to long-distance competition or otherwise
petitors." Most recently, "[Cofetel] has done nothing to stop
Telmex denying private lines to its competitors and Cofetel's
president has stated that court action by Telmex will prevent
Cofetel from undertaking any regulation of Telmex as a
dominant carrier. Mexico thus fails to implement and en-
force the WTO Reference Paper requirement for safeguards
to prevent anti-competitive practices." Id.
152 Id.; WorldCom Letter, supra note 148, at 2. The regu-
latory concern for call termination relies on two types of ar-
guments. At one extreme, call termination is defined as a
monopoly, therefore requiring regulation independently of
market structure and competitive constraints. The second ar-
gument put forward is that regulation is necessary because
negotiations to set reciprocal interconnection charges may
be used as a vehicle for colluding in the retail market, via
high interconnection charges. The consequence of adopting
this approach is that network competition would not relieve
regulators from directly setting terms and conditions for call
termination. On the contrary, the emergence of network
competition increases manifold the number of reciprocal in-
terconnection relations telecommunications network opera-
tors have to negotiate among each other. The implications
for regulation would be an increasing effort to monitor and
potentially regulate call termination charges to an increasing
number of networks. Id.
153 Aileen A. Pisciotta, Telecommunications in Mexico: A
Market in Transition, Vol. 1, Issue 8, Oct. 31, 1997.
Mexico's Federal Telecommunications Law (FTL) re-
quired the creation of a telecommunications regulatory
authority separate from the Secretariat of Communica-
tions and Transportation (SCT). On August 9, 1996,
Cofetel was created by presidential decree. Similar to the
United States Federal Communications Commission
(FCC), Cofetel is charged with both implementing FTL
and promulgating regulations based upon the FTL. Un-
like the FCC, however, Cofetel is located wholly within
the executive branch of the government, and must still
work closely with SCT on competition policy and licens-
ing matters.
Id.
154 Ramiro Tovar Landa, Policy Reform in Networks Infra-
structure: The Case of Mexico, INSTITUTO TECNOL6GiCO
not served by competitive carriers' long-distance
networks. 1 56 The two companies argued addi-
tionally that, although the interconnection resolu-
tion entails Telmex to provide the breakdown of
its lowest retail price by network functions and el-
ements to Cofetel within ten business days of the
issuance of the resolution, Telmex had not of-
fered this information. 157 Additionally, Cofetel
had taken no action on this matter, even though
the interconnection resolution requires Cofetel in
such circumstances to establish an off-net inter-
connection rate on the basis of the best existing
information. 58 Therefore, AT&T contended that
Cofetel has still failed to establish any rate for off-
net interconnection with Telmex, let alone the
cost-oriented rate required by the WTO Refer-
ence Paper.'
59
CompTel objected to two aspects of the Mexi-
AUTONOMO DE MExico, at http://www.vii.org/papers/
mextel.htm.
Mexico has a long history of dejure and de facto govern-
ment intervention in markets, through direct mecha-
nisms (price controls, public sector firms, concessions
and licensing). In later years, changes in the institu-
tional framework as a result of the deregulation of eco-
nomic activity, together with technological change, cre-
ated greater opportunities for competition, by enabling
existing markets to operate, or creating others that were
previously non-existent. In a relatively short time frame
Mexico went through an exposure to a global trade com-
petition, profound privatization process which still par-
tial and the implementation of an unprecedented der-
egulation policy which now struggle to move forward.
Id.
155 Id. As shown by a 1998 Ovum report, "Telmex does
not offer a double transit termination charge service and new
entrants are required to resell a long-distance service in or-
der to provide national termination." AT& T Letter, supra
note 148, at 6. See Solutions to Promote Competition and De-
velop the Telecommunications Sector in Mexico, at http://
www2.apii.or.kr/telwg/19tel/report/mexico.html#6.
156 AT&T Letter, supra note 148, at 6.
Thus, competitive carriers in Mexico may terminate off-
net long-distance calls only by resale of Telmex's long-
distance services at retail rates of nearly 12 cents per
minute plus an interconnection charge. This charge is
more than three times higher than the nationwide rates
available in most European countries and well over twice
the level of the nationwide wholesale rates that are avail-
able in the U.S. market.
Id.
157 Id.
158 Id. The interconnection resolution issued by Cofetel
on October 11, 2000, established that off net termination is
interconnection and entailed the establishment of an off-net
interconnection rate established by subtracting from the low-
est Telmex retail price the cost of network elements not re-
quired by competitive carriers purchasing these services. Id.
159 Id.; see Arturo Briceno, Fixed-Mobile Interconnec-
tion: The Case of Mexico, Strategic Policy Research, The Of-
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can government's telecommunication policies as
they affect the resale of telecommunication ser-
vices. First, Mexico reportedly does not permit li-
censed international private lines, a practice
called international simple resale ("ISR").1 6 °
CompTel argued that "It]he provision of service
on an ISR basis expands competitive entry oppor-
tunities for small U.S. carriers in foreign mar-
kets. "16 1 Secondly, CompTel alleged that Mexico
continues to forbid carriers from engaging in so-
called "pure" switched resale operations, which
would allow carriers to provide service solely
through the resale of services and facilities owned
by other carriers.1 62 "As with ISR, pure switched
resale expands the entry opportunities for small
U.S. carriers in foreign markets, and Mexico's re-
fusal to license such opportunities constitutes a
denial of market access, and an unreasonable re-
striction on the supply of a service. .. "163
C. Issues In The USTR Complaint
1. Lack of effective discipline over Telmex
The first issue raised by the U.S.'s complaint
lice of the Secretary of the ITU, at http://www.itu.int/osg/
sec/spu/ni/fmi/case-studies/mexico-final.pdf. All terms of
interconnection, such as points of interconnection, are nego-
tiated between telecommunications carriers under Cofetel's
supervision. Id.
160 NEwTON'S TELECOM DICTIONARY 465 (16th ed. 2000).
International Simple Resale (ISR) is a "system which allows
international carriers to buy transmission capacity in bulk, to
plug into the public network at each end, and to resell it, one
call at a time. This eliminates the need for settlements be-
tween international carriers." Id.
161 Comptel Letter, supra note 148, at 1.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 2. These practices are in violation of Mexico's
WTO obligations under GATS articles VI and XVI. "Comptel
submits that these restrictive policies are particularly harmful
on routes, such as the US-Mexico route, where there is an
enormous traffic volume between two contiguous countries
whose business communities and populations already are in-
extricably commingled." Id.
164 July Press Release, supra note 142, at 2.
165 Id.; Javier Corrales, Market Reforms in Latin America:
Why They Were Done and Whey They Were Not So Market-Oriented,
at http://www.amherst.edu/-jcorrale/market.pdf (Nov.
2000). After privatizing Telmex in 1990, Mexico waited six
years to establish a regulatory agency (Cofetel). And even
then, it has been difficult to inject competition: Telmex had
enormous clout against Cofetel since it controls 30 percent
of the country's entire stock market. Id.
166 Id.; NEWrON's TELECOM DICTIONARY 483 (16th ed.
2000). A Local Area Network ("LAN") is a "geographically
localized network consisting of both hardware and software.
Devices on a LAN typically transmit data inside buildings or
between buildings located near each other. Id.
concerns the lack of effective government disci-
pline over Telmex, the dominant Mexican tele-
communications carrier. The U.S. charges that
Mexico's WTO obligations entail it to implement
appropriate regulatory measures to thwart a ma-
jor telecommunications supplier from engaging
in anti-competitive practices. 164 Despite Mexico's
telecommunications market being open to com-
petition since 1996 and despite its WTO commit-
ments, Telmex has actually expanded its market
share of long-distance customers from 74 to 81
percent 65 and has discouraged competitive carri-
ers' attempts to build out alternative local net-
works. 166 The USTR also complained that the
Mexican government has not yet initiated effec-
tive measures to prevent Telmex from engaging
in anti-competitive practices ranging from deny-
ing competitors phone lines, pricing services at
predatory rates, refusing interconnection and re-
fusing to pay competitors fees it owes to them.
167
In its complaint to the WTO, the United States
asserted that Cofetel has thus far taken no action
to enforce the dominant carrier regulations is-
sued in October 2000.168 In addition, Cofetel has
167 July Press Release, supra note 142, at 2. In accordance
with USTR's view on Mexico concerning its willingness to
open its market and subject Telmex to international compe-
tition, in January of 2000, the Federal Communications Com-
mission ("FCC") took an unusual step of imposing an
$100,000 fine on Telmex USA. Press Release, Enforcement
Bureau, Federal Communications Commission, FCC's En-
forcement Bureau Proposes $100,000 Fine Against Telmex
USA For Failure to Provide Lines and Circuits to Competi-
tors, at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Enforcement/
News_Releases/2000/nren0001.txt (Jan. 13, 2000). The FCC
imposed the fine for Telmex's failure to provide private cir-
cuits and lines to the U.S. subsidiaries in Mexico as it had
been asked to do as a condition of its authorization to offer
service in the United States. But, the Mexican Federal Tele-
communications Commission, Cofetel, has argued that
Telmex should fight the decision of the FCC. Regarding the
fine, Telmex previously has argued that its decision to stop
providing private circuits and lines to the U.S. subsidiaries in
question was justified and reasonable because of the refusal
of U.S. subsidiaries in Mexico to pay a debt of millions of
dollars in interconnection fees. The FCC, however, rejected
this argument in its explanation of its fine on Telmex USA
for failure of its parent company Telmex to accept any pri-
vate line or line orders from U.S. telecommunication compa-
nies' Mexican subsidiaries. Id.
168 Telcos Setting the Ground for Increased Competition, Yahoo
International Finance Center, at http://biz.yahoo.com/ifc/
mx/news/11901-1.html Uan. 1, 2001) [hereinafter Telcos].
Presently, interconnection fees are established by Cofetel
and have been the subject of controversy and litigation. In
October 2000, the interconnection fees Telmex charged
competing long-distance carriers got reduced by Cofetel. Ac-
tions like this or the outcome of pending litigation could
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taken little enforcement action in response to the
numerous complaints filed since 1997 by competi-
tive carriers concerning anti-competitive actions
by Telmex.169 Among the key requirements of the
dominant carrier rules that Cofetel has yet to en-
force are: the authorization of Telmex's tariffs;
ensuring that Telmex does not engage in anti-
competitive (below-cost) pricing; establishing
cost-based rates for billing and collection, direc-
tory services, collect services, operator services
and other services provided by Telmex to its com-
petitors; Telmex's adherence to quality and deliv-
ery time requirements for services provided to
competitors; and Telmex's compliance with ac-
counting separation rules.
1 7 0
The government of Mexico and Telmex both
reject U.S. claims concerning the failure of
Cofetel to regulate the market and to implement
regulations limiting Telmex's monopoly pow-
ers.1 71 Telmex's owner, Carlos Slim Helu, says the
company "wants a strong, autonomous regulator "
and he welcomes new regulations unless they un-
fairly tie Telmex's hands or contradict Mexican
laws. 1 72 In addition, Telmex argues that it has
stimulated line growth in Mexico and challenges
the USTR's allegation that Mexico has one of the
lowest phone penetration rates in Latin
America. 173 Telmex argues that in the last nine
years the number of fixed line telephones has
grown from 6.4 million installed lines in 1990 to
10.8 million installed lines in the mid-1999.'
74
have a material adverse impact on Telmex's business, pros-
pects, financial condition and results of operations. Id.
169 Mexico's Cofetel to Step Up Regulation Of Telmex After
Talks With Competition Fail, 17 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 530
(Mar. 30, 2000). In 1998, Mexico's Federal Competition
Commission (CFC), the Commission Federal de Com-
petencia, declared Telmex a dominant carrier in local te-
lephony, domestic and international long distance and inter-
city connections. The CFC delegated to Cofetel the responsi-
bility of applying measures to regulate the dominant carrier,
yet their responsibility has failed to become recognized. Id.
170 AT&T Letter, supra note 148, at 4.
171 Kim Sunderland, U.S. Brings Telecom Dispute With Mex-




173 Id. Lindsey Michaels, Thunderbird Global Business
Forums, Americas Conference 2000, Thunderbird Contributes
To and Benefits From The Miami Herald's Americas Conference, at
http://www.t-bird.edu/alumni/globalforums/americascon-
ference.asp#telecomm (2000). Mexico has the lowest tele-
phone per capita density of all Latin American countries. Id.
174 Jorge Nicolin, Opening the Telecommunications Market:
The Mexican Experience, CONNECT WORLD LATIN AMERICA, (4th
2. Failure to ensure timely interconnection
The U.S. complaint also argues that Mexico's
WTO commitments require it to provide "timely,
cost-oriented interconnection at any technically
feasible point in the network."1 75 This obligation
requires competitors to access Telmex's custom-
ers, which constitute 98% of the fixed-line sub-
scribers.' 76 When USTR first publicized the U.S.
complaint, Telmex charged an interconnection
rate of approximately 4.6 cents per minute to con-
nect long-distance carriers to Telmex customers,
representing the single largest cost for any com-
petitive long-distance carrier. 1 77 This rate is drasti-
cally lower than rates of about half-a-cent in the
U.S., Canada and Chile and rates of about one
cent in Argentina and Peru. 
1 78
3. Charging mechanisms for international calls
The United States complaint to the WTO also
claims that Mexico's commitments provide for a
broad range of options for terminating interna-
tional calls to Mexico. 179 Unfortunately however,
some of Mexico's options maintain above-cost ter-
mination rates, thereby raising the rates that con-
sumers pay for calls made between the United
States and Mexico.1 80 For example, Mexico's cur-
rent rate of 19 cents per minute contrasts sharply
with rates of roughly 6 cents per minute for calls
made to the United Kingdom and Canada. 81 Fur-
Quarter 1999) at http://www.cft.gob.mx/html/l_cft/7-dis/
disc_nic/art_280400_2.html (Jan. 16, 2001).
175 July Press Release, supra note 142, at 2.
176 Sunderland, supra note 171, at 7.
177 July Press Release, supra note 142, at 2.
178 Id.
179 Michelle Gabrielle, Global Business: Taming a Bully
U.S. Companies Tackle Mexican Telecommunications Market,
ECOUNTRIES, available at http://www.ecountriescorporate.
com/press/presscuttings/28 11_00.htm (Nov. 28, 2000).
The 77 countries that have now made commitments com-
prise the world's growing telecom service market, with 2000
revenues estimated to reach $900 billion. Id.
180 Sunderland, supra note 171, at 8.
181 Id. While a few countries maintain settlement rates of
one dollar or more per minute, most have reduced signifi-
cantly as a result of competitive pressures. Mexico's rate of 19
cents per minute is equal to that of the Dominican Republic
and compares favorably with Chile (27 cents), Costa Rica (36
cents), Ecuador (50 cents), and El Salvador (31 cents). But it
is significantly higher than the lowest rates available for calls
to more distant countries such as Brazil (15 cents), Israel (15
cents), Italy (12 cents), Lithuania (10 cents), or New Zealand
(9 cents). And it is over three times the rate that applies to
traffic across the northern U.S. border, which has a similar if
2002]
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thermore, under Mexican rules, only the domi-
nant carrier, which has incentive to keep the rate
as high as possible, negotiates the international
rate.182 The U.S. argues that real competition in
the termination of international calls into Mexico
would lead to dramatic reductions in the cost of
U.S. to Mexico calls. 1
8 3
Not surprising, Telmex has a different view.
Concerning international settlement fees, 18 4
which phone companies pay each other for long-
distance calls across borders, Telmex argues it has
decreased its 86 cents per minute fee of 10 years
ago to 19 cents per minute. 85 Telmex further ar-
gues that these fees are relatively typical between
a wealthy nation and a developing nation.186 In
addition, Telmex points out that the U.S. Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC") ap-
plauded Telmex and AT&T for an agreement in
early 2000 to reduce settlement rates ahead of
schedule. 187
D. The Importance of Mexico
The issues raised in the U.S. complaint are not
mere technical violations of WTO agreements.
The U.S. has pursued the telecommunications
case because Mexico is one the U.S.'s largest trad-
ing partners. 88 The United States feels that fail-
ure to resolve the complaints puts the Mexican
economy at an immense disadvantage with Mex-
not identical underlying cost. See Philip Peters, Old Mexico vs.
New Mexico: The Slow Path of Telecom Reform, LEXINGTON INST.,
June 1999 at 10 [hereinafter Peters].
182 Mexico's Federal Law of Economic Competition,
Dec. 24, 1992, Article 7. In order to fix maximum prices for
products and services essential for the domestic economy or
for mass consumption, the following shall apply: . . II.- With-
out affecting the powers invested to other agencies, the Sec-
retariat shall set, through founded and motivated intent of
resolution, the maximum prices of goods and services deter-
mined by the preceding section, pursuant to criteria which
shall seek to prevent shortages of supply. Without interpret-
ing the following as a violation of this law, the Secretariat may
concert or coordinate with producers or distributors neces-
sary actions in this matter, to minimize the effects on compe-
tition and free market participation. Id.
183 See generally Peters, supra note 181.
184 See Brendan Case, U.S. Official Says Telmex Deal May
Not Do Enough, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 4, 2001, at
4D, available at http://www.dallasmorningnews.com/busi-
ness/253104_telmex_04bus.A.html [hereinafter Case]. Set-
tlement fees are what U.S. telephone companies must pay to
Mexican counterparts that carry an international call from
the U.S. border to Mexico's interior. Mexican companies
must also pay U.S. companies to handle calls to the United
States, but most such calls originate north of the border. Id.
ico having fewer phone lines per capita - cur-
rently 11.2 lines per 100 people _189 than almost
every major Latin American country.' 90 In addi-
tion, Mexico has accumulated fewer new lines in
the past four years than that of Chile, Brazil, Gua-
temala and many other countries in Central and
South America. 19' The U.S. also believes that ob-
structions to competition could possibly under-
mine Mexico's ability to attract investment capital
and develop electronic commerce and Internet
services, all of which demand a competitive tele-
communications marketplace. 192 United States
Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky, stated
that "for the sake of Mexico's long-term economic
growth, and the vibrant economic partnership we
have. . .we urge Mexico to work. . .for a timely
resolution of these vital issues."'
93
E. Dispute Timeline
Although the WTO dispute settlement system is
designed to work faster than the previous system
under the GATT, these disputes often take be-
tween one and one and a half years to resolve.
194
The U.S. formally requested consultations in the
WTO over U.S. telecommunications firms' access
to Mexico's market with a detailed list of com-
plaints on August 17, 2000. 195 The request alleged
that since the creation of the GATS, Mexico had
adopted regulatory measures that were anti-com-
185 Sunderland, supra note 171, at 8.
186 Id.
187 Office of Chairman William E. Kennard, Federal
Communications Commission, Chairman Kennard State-
ment on Alternative Settlement Arrangements with Mexico,
at http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Kennard/Statements/
stwek922.html (Apr. 14, 1999).
188 Kenneth MacKay Special Envoy for the Americas to
the U.S., Brazil Business Council Speech, at http://
www.embaixada-americana.org.br/macksp.htm (Sept. 19,
2000). We export more to Mexico than to Britain, France
and Germany combined. Together, Canada and Mexico
purchase more than 40% of all US exports. Id.
139 U.S. Taking Mexican Interconnection Concern. to WIO,
COMM. DAILY, 1,July 31, 2000.




194 See Trading Into the Future: The Introduction to the WFO,
Settling Disputes, The Panel Process, at http://www.wto.org/en-
glish/thewtoe/whatise/tif-e/displ-e.htm (last visited Jan.
17, 2001).
195 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, REQUEST FOR CONSUL-
rATIONS, WT/DS204/1/S/L/88 (Aug. 29, 2000).
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petitive and, in fact, tolerated privately established
market access barriers.' 96 The letter cited specific
examples of how Mexico had failed to live up to
its commitments under Article XVI of the
GATS.1 9 7 Overall, the United States considered
the action and inaction by Mexico to be incom-
patible with its GATS commitments and obliga-
tions, including Articles VI, XVI and XVII; Mex-
ico's additional commitments under Article XVIII
as set forth in the Reference Paper inscribed in
Mexico's Schedule of Specific Commitments, in-
cluding sections 1, 2, 3 and 5, and the GATS An-
nex on Telecommunications sections 4 and 5.198
On October 10, 2000, the United States and
Mexico held WTO consultations in Guadalajara,
Mexico that failed to resolve overall U.S. con-
cerns.199 On October 20, the United States sent a
letter to the Government of Mexico, acknowledg-
ing areas of progress and suggesting areas where
immediate steps would be necessary to ensure
Mexico's compliance with its WTO obligations.
200
The candid letter displayed a shift in tone from
earlier signals that the U.S. might explore a vari-
ety of avenues for dispute settlement before
resorting to a WTO panel.20 1 One of the key de-
mands highlighted in the letter was the transfor-
mation of Mexico's current rules on cross-border
telecommunications traffic.
20 2
In response to the U.S. letter, Mexico issued
rules to regulate the anti-competitive practices of
Telmex and announced significant reductions in
long-distance interconnection rates for 2001.203
Despite Mexico's positive steps, on November 8,
2000, USTR announced that the United States
196 Letter from Rita Hayes, U.S. Ambassador to the WTO
and Deputy USTR, to Alejandro de la Pena, Mexican Ambas-
sador to the WTO on Telecom, (Aug.17, 2000) (on file with
USTR).
197 Id.
198 Id. at 2; see also CATS Annex, supra note 38.
199 See generally Pablo Garibian, Mexico, U.S. To Start WTO
Telecoms Negotiations, RUETERS, at http://www.kagan.com/
archive/reuters/2000/ 10/09/2000100922tcm.shtml (Oct. 9,
2000).
200 Letter from Richard Fisher, USTR, to Luise Fer-
nando de la Calle Pardo, SECOFI, (Oct. 20, 2000) (on file
with USTR).
201 Id. In the letter, USTR Deputy Richard Fisher ex-
presses the need for Mexico to understand that the issues
raised are central to USTR's decision regarding the need for
arbitration by a WTO panel.
202 Id.
203 Mexico, US Discuss Telecoms Market Dispute,
TIMESOFINDIA.CoM, at http://www.timesofindia.com/
121000/12infol2.htm (Oct. 12, 2000). Since the complaint
would request the establishment of a WTO dis-
pute settlement panel in order to consider U.S.
claims that Mexico had failed to comply with its
WTO commitments in the telecommunication
services sector.20 4 The request filed by the U.S. at
the meeting of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body
was blocked by Mexico. The U.S. again requested
a dispute settlement panel in January 2001 and a
panel was created. USTR said the panel was neces-
sary because Telmex had subsequently filed legal
challenges against both measures undertaken by
the Mexican government.20 5 In addition, the Gov-
ernment of Mexico appeared reluctant to enforce
new rules against Telmex.20
6
IV. ISSUES DECIDED
While the U.S. and Mexico were skirmishing
about the creation of the WTO arbitration panel,
a voluntary industry agreement was reached on
December 29, 2000 between Telmex, Alestra and
Avantel and then ratified by Mexico's new Com-
munications and Transportation Secretary Pedro
Cerisola on January 2, 2 0 0 1 .2 07 The agreement re-
solves several controversies among the parties in-
cluding the usage of certain assets, the settlement
of outstanding debts and disagreements on inter-
connection rates, local interconnection,, resale
tariffs, quality standards and international traffic,
among other subjects. 208 The industry agreement,
however, left some key aspects of the complaint
unresolved, including Mexico's failure to provide
a system of competition for international calls and
its failure to curb Telmex's anti-competitive prac-
was filed in July 2000, Mexico's telecom regulatory agency,
Cofetel, published long-awaited regulations meant to curb
Telmex's monopolistic powers and to level the playing field
for competitors. Cofetel has also published new, lower inter-
connection fees for long-distance competitors of Telmex.
Telmex and Cofetel have been battling in the courts for
three years over competition issues, and Cofetel's new moves
seem destined to ignite yet another round of legal battles. Id.
204 Press Release, United States Trade Representative,
United States to Request WTO Panel on Mexico Telecommu-
nications, at http://www.ustr.gov/releases/2000/11/00-
78.html (Nov. 8, 2000)
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Industry Telecom Pact Narrows Issues In U.S.-Mexico Dis-
pute, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, (Jan. 5, 2001) [hereinafter Pact].
208 Press Release, Telefonos de Mexico, DA de CV,
Agreement between Telmex and Long Distance Operators







The most significant aspect of the industry
agreement was Telmex's decision to drop its chal-
lenge to a resolution by Cofetel to significantly re-
duce the fees Telmex charges competitors to com-
plete calls from their customers via Telmex's net-
works, as well as its long-distance interconnection
fees. 2 10 During the year 2001, Telmex will abide
by the 1.25 cent per minute interconnection fee
set by Cofetel.21' In addition, Telmex agreed to
reduce the amount it charges competitors for ac-
cess to its networks in remote areas, known as "off-
net" charges. 21 2 Competitors will "now be charged
75 percent of the lowest retail rate Telmex offers
to customers for access to those networks. 2 18
Alestra and Avantel approved a compensation
scheme to reimburse Telmex for money it had in-
vested as special project fees to improve its net-
works to make interconnection feasible. 21 4 This
agreement includes a lump-sum fee by the two
companies of about $140 million. But as much as
85 percent of the money to be paid to Telmex will
be paid back through a five cent per minute long
distance surcharge to be functional through 2004
or until the full amount is compensated.
2 15
The industry agreement includes a set of basic
criteria for resolution of the issues surrounding
international calls. 2 16 These criteria could pave
the way for an agreement, perhaps in separate ne-
gotiations between Telmex and U.S. carriers, on a
new settlement rate. 217 The existing 19-cent rate
was negotiated only until the end of 2000.218
209 See id.
210 Press Release, Telefonos de Mexico, DA de CV,
Telmex Signs Landmark Industry Agreement to Spur Com-




212 U.S. Serves Mexico With Demands, Deadline to Resolve
Telecom Dispute, INSIDE US TRADE, 1, Oct. 27, 2000 [hereinaf-
ter Demands].
213 Pact, supra note 207, at 1.
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 Telcos, supra note 168, at 1. "Debt Settlement: Compa-
nies acknowledged their commitments to the "one-time in-
vestments" made by Telmex for interconnection services. A
compensation system for settlement was established and be-
came effective immediately. Telmex will receive $180 million
from interconnection and special projects. One-hundred
thirty seven million dollars will be transferred immediately
($70 million from Alestra and $67 million from Avantel)
while the remaining $43 million will be paid over five years.
Interconnection Rate: Parties accepted the fee for switched
interconnection service set by Cofetel at $0.0125 per minute.
The companies also reached agreement on a
compensation scheme for local interconnection
when Telmex completes local calls to competi-
tors' customers or vice versa.2 19 This would work
in keeping with a "bill-and-keep" system,2 20 where
carriers will pocket fees collected from their own
customers and anticipate that their competitors
will do the same with fees owed to them, instead
of shifting interconnection fees collected to the
carrier that is owed the fee.22 1 Additionally,
Telmex decided to appoint an independent audi-
tor to guarantee the quality of service it provides
to its competitors. 222 It also arranged to provide
private lines, which will also be observed by an in-
dependent auditor, for sale to competitors' cus-
tomers.
22 3
Many industry insiders said that the willingness
to negotiate on the part of Telmex was a result of
a combination of political pressure from the U.S.
through its WTO case and the new Mexican presi-
dential administration of the reform-minded Vi-
cente Fox.224 These factors will continue to affect
the outstanding issues when the case is decided by
the WTO.
V. REMAINING ISSUES TO BE DECIDED BY
THE WTO, IF THE CASE MOVES
FORWARD
Despite the industry agreement in January
2000, USTR has not amended its complaint
against the government of Mexico. But in June
The fee is valid for the period between January 1, 2001 and
December 31, 2001 and applies to local and DLD traffic. LD
and local circuits. Telmex will make available collocation, lo-
cal and long-distance interconnection resources. Tariffs are
to be discounted by 30% from the current "best registered"
tariff for competing operators to enjoy wholesale prices. In-
ter-urban transport: From October 1, 2000 to December 31,
2001, the new tariff will be equivalent to 75% of the best per-
minute tariff registered, billed or applied by Telmex in the
market. International traffic: The termination fees for inter-
national calls will be negotiated jointly by the three operators
as opposed to previous practices in which Telmex was the
only Mexican operator involved." Id.
217 Telcos, supra note 168, at 3.
218 Pact, supra note 207, at 2.
219 Information Statement, Telefonos de Mexico, DA de
CV, Mexico's Long Distance Operators Agreement, at http:/
/www.telmex.com.mx/internos/prensa/comunicados/
recientes/001227i.html (Dec. 27, 2000).
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2001, the USTR backed away significantly from a
threat to bring Mexico before a WTO dispute set-
tlement panel. 225 The U.S. had threatened to
move to a panel in the absence of progress from
Mexico by June 1, 2001, but WorldCom struck a
deal with Telmex that was said to reduce a key
rate charged for international calls. 226 Despite the
fact that USTR is not formally dropping its WTO
complaint, USTR feels secure that WorldCom and
Telmex "support regulatory reforms that would
boost competition." 227
Under the deal, beginning January 1, 2001 the
settlement rate was reduced from 19 cents per
minute to 15.5 cents per minute.228 In addition,
the rate would drop again beginning in 2002 to
13.5 cents per minute and to ten cents per minute
in 2003.229 Starting in 2004, WorldCom would be
able to negotiate the settlement rates on a com-
petitive basis with Mexican providers, whereas
under the current system, it may only negotiate
one rate with Telmex that applies to all cross-bor-
der traffic. 230 WorldCom and Telmex agreed to
urge Mexico and the U.S. government to make
necessary regulatory changes to allow increased
competition by 2004.231
AT&T is not in agreement with WorldCom on
its deal with Telmex and will seek to have USTR
push the dispute settlement process forward.
AT&T maintains that the rates negotiated by
WorldCom's deal are far too high to be consistent
with Mexico's WTO commitments to charge for
interconnection based on costs of providing the
service.
232
While AT&T was not a party to the WorldCom/
Telmex negotiations, under U.S. telecommunica-
tions law they are entitled to sign on under the
same terms as WorldCom received. AT&T is still
in separate, corresponding talks with Telmex on
the issue. AT&T said it will oppose the approval of
the WorldCom/Telmex deal by the FCC on the
225 USTR Postpones W'O Action On Mexican Telecom Regu-
lation, CORPORATE MEXICO: REFORMA (MEXICO), available at
2001 WL3332555, (June 4, 2001).
226 USTR Backs Off Mexico WTO Threat In Wake Of Telecom





228 AT&T To Oppose WorldCom-Telmex Settlement Rates
Agreement At FCC, WASHINGTON TELECOM NEwswiRE, May 31,
2001, at 4, available at 2001 WL7162130.
229 Id.
230 Id.
grounds that the rates negotiated by the compa-
nies are still not in the public's interest.233 AT&T
asserts that the proposed rates are well above the
four cent cost of providing the service and the set-
tlement rates that prevail in competitive countries
and do not conform with Mexico's prior WTO
commitments. 234 Critics of the agreement, how-
ever, argue that the pact does not represent a
commitment from governments to make these
changes and "charge that there is no guarantee
that the Mexican government will allow those
changes to take effect in 2004."235
In the agreement, one important change from
the U.S. standpoint includes Mexico putting an
end to a requirement that only the carrier with
the greatest market share (Telmex) be allowed to
negotiate settlement rates.236 This means that
U.S. companies have the option of negotiating
more favorable rates with Telmex's competitors
and Telmex's affiliates. 237 In addition, the pact
entails removing U.S. and Mexican regulations
that enforce a "proportionate return" require-
ment, an arrangement under which companies
service incoming international calls in proportion
to the outgoing calls that originate with them.238
On the U.S. side, the FCC has to certify that com-
petition conditions existed in Mexico such that its
international settlement policy, including the pro-
portionate return requirement, need no longer
apply.
239
One vital difference in the WorldCom deal and
the U.S. original demands is that the U.S. has
pressed Mexico for open competition in interna-
tional calls beginning in 2003, while the
WorldCom deal would hold off until 2004.240
While the agreement would progressively reduce
the settlement rate companies on either side of
the border charge each other to complete, there
are still issues between the United States and Mex-
ico that are not resolved. These issues include
231 AT&T Balks At WorldCom-Telmex Settlement Rates Pact,
21 COMM. DAILY, 1, June 1, 2001 (hereinafter AT&T Balks].
232 Id.
233 WorldCom filed the deal with the FCC on May 30,
2001. Interested parties had twenty-one days in which to com-
ment. Id.
234 AT&T Balks, supra note 231, at 2.
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Mexico's failure to provide a system of competi-
tion for international calls and its failure to "curb
Telmex's anti-competitive practices in the mar-
ket."
2 41
With the additional agreement between
Telmex and WorldCom much of what was origi-
nally part of USTR's complaint has been re-
solved.242 As a result, the U.S. government may be
reluctant for the World Trade Organization Dis-
pute Panel to decide the remaining issues because
they are narrower and the Basic Telecom Agree-
ment is not explicit with regard to these issues.
Nevertheless, the United States should proceed
with the remaining issues even if the Dispute Set-
tlement Body persists in resolving in the United
State's favor. A rule could provide helpful guide-
lines to all countries and their telecommunica-
tions industries.
If the WTO Dispute Settlement Body does have
the opportunity to decide these issues, it should
require the Government of Mexico to live up to
its old commitments under the Basic Telecom
Agreement along with Telmex's new commit-
ments under the WorldCom agreement. This
case, if ever presented, includes issues of commer-
cial and legal significance for the future of the
telecommunications industry.243 The Dispute Set-
tlement Body can clear up the ambiguities in the
Agreement, thereby setting a precedent for future
cases.
Real competition in the termination of interna-
tional calls into Mexico would lead to dramatic re-
ductions in the cost of U.S.-Mexico calls, greatly
enhancing the ability of the 20 million Mexicans
and Mexican-Americans living in the United
States to stay in touch with families and friends in
Mexico. 244 The current system denies the majority
of Mexican and U.S. consumers the benefits of
better services and lower prices.2 45 The Dispute
Settlement Body should bear in mind that the
main objectives of the Basic Telecom Agreement
were to increase coverage of telecommunications
services and to make sure that the entire popula-
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 Press Release, United States Trade Representative,
Year 2000 Foreign Trade Barriers Report (March 31, 2000). Mex-
ico has exceeded Japan to become the United States' second
largest single country trading partner and has the fastest
growing major U.S. export market over the last six years.
Since the NAFTA was enacted on January 1, 1994, U.S. ex-
ports to Mexico have increased by 109 percent, larger growth
than to any other major single-country market. Id.
tion received more and better services.2 4 6 The lib-
eralization and competition policies within the
Agreement are only means to achieve such
goals.2 47 A consumer-driven environment where
consumers have real choice requires a wide range
of suppliers of telecommunications services.
248
This is why fostering competition is so important.
The WTO should find that the Government of
Mexico has violated the Basic Telecom Agree-
ment and should require Mexico to remedy its vi-
olations.
VI. CONCLUSION
The U.S.-Mexico case is likely to be a prototype
for future telecommunication disputes before the
WTO, if USTR decides to push forward with the
case in the future. First, the same telecommunica-
tion issues that are involved in this case will likely
arise with other countries. Even though telecom-
munications issues and facts tend to be very spe-
cific, the issues of interconnection fees, the deter-
mination of fair costs between domestic and inter-
national providers and the willingness of the do-
mestic regulator to actually regulate the national
monopoly are just a few of the issues that are com-
mon to many markets. Second, while it is true that
the U.S. was motivated to challenge Mexico's poli-
cies because Mexico is one of the U.S.'s largest
trading partners, there are many other markets
around the world that possess potential for U.S.
companies. Moreover, other countries with well-
developed telecom industries may perceive the
U.S. challenge as a template for their own chal-
lenges. The U.S. shares a border with Mexico, and
considering the cross border interactions and the
numerous phone calls between the two countries,
the Mexican telecommunications industry is not
well developed. The same could be said for West-
ern Europe and the emerging telecom markets in
Eastern Europe. Even if the U.S.-Mexico dispute
sets no precedent, the importance of the Mexican
market has been enough to convince the USTR as
244 July Press Release, supra note 142 at 30.
245 See Case, supra note 184, at 2.
246 See Statement of Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky,
Basic Telecom Negotiations, Feb. 15, 1997, at http://
www.ustr.gov/html/barshefsky.html [hereinafter Barshefsky
Statement]; see WTO Agreement, supra note 2.
247 Barshefsky Statement, supra note 246, at 1.
248 Doris Benavides, Telmex Agrees To Lower Tariff Prices,
IDG NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 3, 2001, at www.e-business-
world.com/english/crdtelmex_342328.html.
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well as WorldCom and AT&T to dedicate a signifi-
cant amount of resources to fighting this case.
Any dispute that is brought to the WTO has a
political element. To be sure, the U.S. needed not
just a good case on the merits of the Basic
Telecom Agreement, but the political determina-
tion to bring an ally and trading partner before
the WTO. Not surprising, that political will is sup-
plemented by the economic interests of the U.S.
companies involved in the dispute. Conversely,
Mexico has its own political and economic inter-
ests to address as well.
The elections in both the U.S. and Mexico in
the past year have changed the political environ-
ment. Neither the Bush Administration in the
U.S. nor the Fox Administration in Mexico was re-
sponsible for the dispute being brought to the
WTO. It is possible that they will attempt once
again to settle the case. Having said that, it is diffi-
cult to predict the impact that the presidential ad-
ministration of Vicente Fox may have on the Mex-
ican telecommunications regulatory environment.
The Fox administration has announced its inten-
tion to stimulate investment in the telecommuni-
cations sector with reforms to the federal commu-
nications law, including plans to provide universal
telephone service by doubling the current num-
ber of phone lines in five years. One cannot pre-
dict whether or when such new plans may be im-
plemented and their effects on U.S. business.
Similarly, it is difficult to predict the impact
that the Bush administration will have on the
pending case. While the Clinton administration
put a lot of time and resources into the case, it
remains to be seen if the Bush administration will
do the same even after the WorldCom pact. Pre-
sumably, the same political and economic calcula-
tions that caused the Clinton Administration to
bring the case still prevail, but given the multitude
of trade issues between the United States and
Mexico, there is no certainty that the telecom case
will retain the same priority.
One of the lessons of the U.S.-Mexico case so
far is that the Basic Telecom Agreement is written
broadly, yet the problems in the telecommunica-
tions industry are specific and that the WTO is a
dull instrument at best. Likewise, the Agreement
is not self-executing. What matters in the long run
is how countries choose to implement the text. If
countries are faithful to the text and purpose of
the Basic Telecom Agreement there will be few
disputes.
Of course, even if national governments at-
tempt to faithfully implement the Telecom Agree-
ment, there can be complications arising from the
local judicial and regulatory systems. In Mexico,
for example, Cofetel is not the ultimate authority
on Telmex since any of the regulator's decisions
can be overturned by Mexican courts. And, at this
point, it appears that Telmex has no intention of
dropping it legal actions against Cofetel.
Without a WTO ruling, the rights of future U.S.
carriers in the Mexican market will remain unpro-
tected. Avantel and Alestra might have benefited
from an agreement with Telmex, but there are no
guarantees that the incumbent's generosity will
extend to future entrants or that Telmex will not
change its mind.
There is no doubt that much attention will be
directed at the WTO Dispute Settlement Body if it
decides its first telecommunications case. While
the effects of non-compliance concerning the Ba-
sic Telecom Act have been unclear, the WTO has
a chance to clarify its position on these issues.
First, the WTO should find that there is not a sys-
tem of competition for international calls that ac-
tually exists in Mexico. Second, the WTO should
make it clear it will not tolerate Telmex's anti-
competitive practices under the Basic Telecom
Agreement. The WTO should direct Mexico to
remedy these problems and come into compli-
ance with its obligations under the Basic Telecom
Agreement. Such actions by the WTO will help to
ensure the effectiveness of the Agreement and
provide an incentive for other countries to adhere
to their obligations.
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